I am a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sydney. Before coming to Sydney, I was a Junior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford. I was an undergraduate at Princeton and a PhD student in philosophy at MIT.
I work mainly in epistemology and decision theory.
- Reasons without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time, Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Hindsight Bias is not a Bias, forthcoming in Analysis.
- Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- Summary and Reply to Critics, for a symposium on Reasons without Persons, Analysis 77 (3): 569-71 and 607-18, 2017.
- Should Juries Deliberate?, Social Epistemology 31 (4): 368-86, 2017.
- Uniqueness and Metaepistemology (with Daniel Greco), The Journal of Philosophy 113 (8): 365-95, 2016
- Mental Processes and Synchronicity, Mind 125 (499):873-888, 2016.
- Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions (with Caspar Hare), Noûs 50 (3):604-628, 2016
- Does MITE Make Right?: Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty,
- Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 11, pp. 102-28, 2016.
- A Defense of Objectivism about Evidential Support, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):716-743, 2015
- Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief, Logos and Episteme 6 (4):495-513, 2015
- Time-Slice Rationality, Mind 124 (494): 449-491, 2015
- Options and Diachronic Tragedy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2): 423-451, 2015
- Incoherence without Exploitability, Noûs 47 (3): 482-495, 2013
- Options and the Subjective Ought, Philosophical Studies 158 (2): 343-360, 2012
- ARC Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (DECRA) 2017-2020: Groups as Individuals: New Insights on Group Rationality and Agency
- ARC Discovery Project (DP) 2018-2021: Formal Approaches to Legal Reasoning (with Mark Colyvan)