

Brian Hedden

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Areas of Specialization

Epistemology, Decision Theory

Areas of Competence

Ethics, Philosophy of Language, Logic, Philosophy of Science

Employment

Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, 2018-present

Lecturer in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, 2015-2017

Junior Research Fellow, Somerville College, University of Oxford, 2012 - 2014

Education

Ph.D. in Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012

Committee: Caspar Hare (chair), Robert Stalnaker, Roger White

Dissertation: 'Consistency in Choice and Credence'

A.B. in Philosophy, Princeton University, *summa cum laude*, 2006

Book

Reasons without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time, Oxford University Press, 2015.

Papers (continued on next page)

'Consequentialism and Collective Action,' forthcoming in *Ethics*

'Introduction to Part Two: Rationality and Time,' forthcoming in Andrea Sauchelli (ed), *Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry*, Routledge.

'Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality,' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 99, no 3 (2019): 581–604.

'Legal Probabilism: A Qualified Defense,' with Mark Colyvan, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 27, no 4 (2019): 448–68.

'Rationality and Synchronic Identity,' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 97, no 3 (2019): 544–58.

'Hindsight Bias is not a Bias,' *Analysis* 79, no 1 (2019): 43–52.

'Author's Introduction' and 'Reply to Critics,' for a symposium on *Reasons without Persons*. *Analysis* 77, no 3 (2017): 569–71 and 607–18.

- ‘Should Juries Deliberate?,’ *Social Epistemology* 31, no 4 (2017): 368–86.
- ‘Uniqueness and Metaepistemology,’ with Daniel Greco, *The Journal of Philosophy* 113, no 8 (2016): 365–95.
- ‘Mental Processes and Synchronicity,’ *Mind* 125, no 499 (2016): 873–888.
- ‘Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions,’ with Caspar Hare. *Noûs* 50, no 3 (2016): 604–628.
- ‘Does MITE Make Right? On Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty,’ In Russ Schafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* Volume 11 (2016). pp. 102–128.
- ‘A Defense of Objectivism about Evidential Support.’ *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 45, no. 5–6 (2016): 716–43.
- ‘Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief,’ *Logos and Episteme* 6 no. 4 (2015): 495–513.
- ‘Time-Slice Rationality,’ *Mind* 124, no. 494 (2015): 449–491.
- ‘Options and Diachronic Tragedy,’ *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 90, no. 2 (2015): 423–451.
- ‘Incoherence without Exploitability,’ *Noûs* 47, no. 3 (2013): 482–495.
- ‘Options and the Subjective *Ought*,’ *Philosophical Studies* 158, no. 2 (2012): 343–360.

Book Reviews

- Review of *Time Biases* (OUP 2018), by Meghan Sullivan. forthcoming in *Philosophical Review*
- Review of *Metaepistemology* (OUP 2019), edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. Available: <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/metaepistemology/>

Competitive Grants

- Discovery Early Career Research Award (DECRA), Australian Research Council, ‘Groups as Individuals: New Insights on Group Rationality and Agency.’ 2017–2020.
- Discovery Project (DP), Australian Research Council. ‘Formal Approaches to Legal Reasoning.’ Co-CI with Mark Colyvan. 2018–2021.
- Sydney-Utrecht University Collaborative Partnership Award Scheme, ‘Conspiracy Theories in the Information Age,’ 2020. (As non-CI Participant). CI’s: Mark Colyvan (Sydney) and Daniel Cohnitz (Utrecht).
- Faculty Collaborative Research Scheme (FCRS), University of Sydney. With Kristie Miller, Mark Colyvan, Alex Holcombe, Agnieszka Tymula, David Braddon-Mitchell, and Andrew Latham. 2017–2018.

Popular Writings

- ‘Power to the People,’ with Mark Colyvan. *The New Philosopher* # 21, 30 August, 2018.
Available: <https://www.newphilosopher.com/articles/power-to-the-people/>

Presentations

- ‘Consequentialism and Collective Action’
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Feb 2019
Yale University, Feb 2019
University of Colorado-Boulder, Mar 2019
University of Adelaide, Apr 2019

Australian National University, Apr 2019

University of Sydney, Sep 2019

Australian Catholic University, Nov 2019

'Rationality and Synchronic Identity'

University of Sydney, Aug 2017

Australian National University, Apr 2018

'Hindsight Bias is not a Bias'

Macquarie University, Mar 2018

Formal Epistemology Workshop, U. of Toronto, Jun 2018

Australasian Association of Philosophy, Jul 2018

'Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality'

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dec 2016

University of Sydney, Sep 2016

Society for Exact Philosophy, University of Calgary, May 2017

Australian National University, Aug 2018

'Rationality and Anticipated Future Desires'

Australian National University, Oct 2016

'Individual Time-Bias and Social Discounting'

Cambridge University, Jun 2016

Charles Sturt University (CAPPE), May 2016

University of New South Wales, Apr 2016

University of Sydney, Apr 2016

'A Defense of Objectivism about Evidential Support'

University of Sydney, May 2015

University of Wisconsin, Madison, Sep 2015

'Uniqueness and Metaepistemology'

University of Sydney, Apr 2015

Australian National University, Apr 2015

University of Arizona, Sep 2014

'Uniqueness and Time-Slice Rationality'

Arizona State University, Sep 2014

Princeton University, Sep 2014

Yale University, Sep 2014

'Time-Slice Rationality'

Formal Epistemology Festival, Jun 2013

Australian National University, Mar 2013

University of Sydney Current Projects Seminar, Mar 2013
Cambridge University Serious Metaphysics Group, Feb 2013
Oxford Theoretical Work in Progress Seminar, Nov 2012
Arché/St. Andrews, Nov 2012

‘Options and the Subjective *Ought*’

Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Aug 2011
Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Aug 2011
MITing of the Minds, Jan 2011

‘Incoherence without Exploitability’

CMU *Episteme* Formal Epistemology Conference, Jun 2011
MIT Work in Progress, Apr 2011

‘Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions’ (with Caspar Hare)

Cambridge/MIT Workshop on Decision Theory, Univ College, Cambridge, May 2012
Seminar on Addiction, taught by Richard Holton and Drazen Prelec, Apr 2011

‘Comments on Andrew Sepielli’

St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality, May 2011

‘Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty’

Madison Metaethics Workshop, Sep 2014
Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, Jul 2010

‘Rational Failures of Self-Knowledge’

MIT-Institut Jean Nicod Conference on Self-Locating Beliefs, Mar 2010

‘Comments on Vann McGee’

MITing of the Minds, Jan 2010

Academic Service

Placement Coordinator: 2016-present

SOPHI Lead for EMCR (Early- and Mid-Career Researcher Network): 2019-present

SOPHI UG Degree Advisor: 2016-present

Lead organiser of 2020 Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) Conference: 2019-present

Department research seminar (colloquium) organiser (2015-6)

Journal referee for: *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosopher’s Imprint*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Synthese*, *Dialectica*, *Erkenntnis*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Noûs*, *Ergo*, and *Mind*.

Monograph referee for: Oxford University Press, Routledge.

Competitive grant referee for: Australian Research Council, Canada Research Chairs